Political Factors as Determinants of Intergovernmental Transfers of Ramo 33 in Mexico
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55555/IS.32.730Keywords:
ideological alignment, fiscal federalism, defective democracies, ordinal logistic regressionAbstract
The objective of this paper is to analyze the influence of some political factors on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers of Ramo 33 in Mexico. Three presidential periods of different political parties were studied using ordinal logistic regression analysis. The originality lies in the fact that it is possible to examine the effect of political factors in varied ideological contexts. The causal mechanism linking political factors to the allocations is based on the institutional configuration of Mexican presidentialism, which was consolidated mainly during the post-revolutionary period under pri (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) governments. Despite the existence of a constitutional framework that establishes the separation of powers, in practice the executive branch has concentrated powers that weaken institutional checks and balances, generating dynamics typical of Illiberal democracies. The findings reveal that, for the pan (Partido Acción Nacional) period, the variables were not significant. For the entire pri period, state parliamentary configuration was significant; for the electoral triennium, ideological coincidence was significant. This variable was also significant for the morena period. The above results suggest that in some contexts ideological alignment may influence the distribution of Ramo 33, especially in electoral periods. The limitation is that these findings respond to a specific institutional context, so their generalization to other environments should be done with caution.References
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